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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis studies Thailand-Vietnam relations in the 1990s. Since Vietnam 
invaded Cambodia at the end of 1978, their bilateral relations became poor. In 1986, 
Vietnam implemented the “Doi Moi” policy to solve domestic economic problems. 
Chatichai Choonhavan the leader of Thailand responded to this new policy of Vietnam 
with the “turning the Indochina battlefields into market places” policy. These new 
policies improved the relations between the two countries. In the early 1990s, 
Thailand and Vietnam focused their cooperation on economic issues. They could 
agree on many sensitive issues in the late 1990s and cooperated in various areas. In the 
post-Cold War period, the major powers were unreliable for Vietnam. Unlike the 
regional organizations established earlier, ASEAN tried to avoid being influenced by 
major powers. Vietnam became more involved in ASEAN and gained membership in 
1995 with Thailand’s support. Thailand and Vietnam also cooperated in sub-regional 
organizations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Before the 1990s, Thailand-Vietnam relations were quite poor. There was a short period, 
from March 24, 1946 – August 21, 1946, when they had friendly relations under Pridi 
Phanomyong the Prime Minister of Thailand who supported North Vietnam to fight against 
France. However, the following administrations under the military leadership instead sided with 
the United States against Communism and established relations with South Vietnam. Later, when 
North Vietnam took over South Vietnam in 1975, Thailand and Vietnam enjoyed a brief period 
of cordial relations when Vietnam approached Thailand to establish diplomatic relations. 
Although the two countries had established their diplomatic relations since August 6, 1976, 
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia at the end of 1978 turned the cordial relations into an enmity 
for over a period of ten years. Thailand-Vietnam relations before the 1990s were highly 
influenced by international politics and the major powers, especially the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and China. 
In contrast to the confrontation between the two countries in the pre-1990 period, 
Thailand-Vietnam relations in the 1990s were characterized by economic cooperation that led to 
a wide-range of collaborations in other areas as well at different levels: bilateral, regional, and 
sub-regional. Thailand-Vietnam relations began to improve after 1988 when Thailand carried out 
the “Turning the battlefield into a marketplace” policy in response to Vietnam’s “Doi Moi” 
policy. Thereafter, from 1990-1995, there were many exchange of visits between the two 
countries that led to several economic agreements. In the 1990s, the two countries agreed on 
many important issues, for example Vietnamese migrants, visa-free agreements, and maritime 
demarcation. In addition, the two countries also had a cultural agreement. At the international 
level, Thailand supported Vietnam to become a member of ASEAN in 1995. Unlike the pre-1990 
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period, the major powers were no longer an important factor in influencing Thailand-Vietnam 
relations. In the 1990s, Vietnam could no longer rely on the Soviet Union. In addition, the United 
States did not have diplomatic relations with Vietnam until 1995. Japan followed the United 
States policy of economic sanctions against Vietnam. China could not be an ally to Vietnam like 
the Soviet Union had been. Being a socialist country, Vietnam did not have ties outside of the 
communist countries. This posed a hardship for the Vietnamese economy which forced Vietnam 
to implement domestic reforms that would follow a more market economy. In the end, Vietnam 
tried to open up to the outside world. To do so, Vietnam had to turn to ASEAN which was more 
reliable than the major powers (the Soviet Union, China, the United States, and Japan). However, 
Vietnam earlier had an unfavorable view towards ASEAN. Vietnam-ASEAN relations were also 
bad after Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Thailand facilitated Vietnam’s engagement with ASEAN. 
Unlike SEATO and ASA, ASEAN was not influenced by the major power countries. Besides, 
both Thailand and Vietnam also cooperated in sub-regional organizations, such as the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region (GMS) and the Mekong River Commission (MRC). 
 
Aim of Study 
Because there were many changes after the end of the Cold War, the 1990s became an 
important period to witness the development of bilateral relations between Thailand and 
Vietnam.  This study aims to look into Thailand-Vietnam relations in the 1990s. It examines the 
important factors that helped to improve Thailand-Vietnam relations and the nature of the 
cooperation between the two countries in the 1990s. 
   3 
There have been many sources that suggest the impetus for Thailand-Vietnam relations 
from conflict into collaboration came from both Thailand and Vietnam. Particularly, the Doi Moi 
policy of Vietnam in 1986 set the stage for the “Turning the battlefield into a market place” 
policy of Chatichai Choonhavan administration of Thailand. Thailand’s foreign policy under 
Chatichai Choonhavan was a big shift from the stance held by the earlier administration which 
together with ASEAN was to be hard on Vietnam because Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Thailand 
was considered the “front-line state” against further Vietnamese expansion. This study addresses 
the economic cooperation that became the theme of Thailand-Vietnam relations in the 1990s, 
rather than political conflicts as in many other studies. Economic cooperation led to cooperation 
in other areas. Economic issues served as the channel for Thailand and Vietnam to engage in 
many positive ways. The two countries later would agree on important political issues, which 
also led to an even greater economic cooperation. Aside from political and economic issues, they 
also had a cultural agreement. Thailand also provided technical assistance to Vietnam. 
 In addition, unlike the pre-1990 period, the major powers did not have much direct 
influence in Thailand-Vietnam relations. Rather, Thailand and Vietnam relations were influenced 
by regional cooperation (ASEAN) and sub-regional cooperation (GMS and MRC). Thailand and 
Vietnam relations improved in these organizations. Thailand had been very supportive of 
Vietnam’s ASEAN membership and tried to play the role as the go-between for Vietnam and 
other countries. The history of the establishment of regional organizations before ASEAN is 
discussed to show how ASEAN is different from them, which made it a plausible organization to 
help improve Thailand-Vietnam relations. The sub-regional cooperation also enhances people-to-
people ties between the Thais and the Vietnamese. 
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 Chapter 1 gives background on Thailand-Vietnam relations before the 1990s. This 
chapter traces Thailand-Vietnam relations from 1946 when Thailand was led by Pridi 
Phanomyong until the end of 1978 when Vietnam invaded Cambodia. The details on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between Thailand and Vietnam are also discussed.  
 Chapter 2 discusses Thailand-Vietnam relations in the 1990s. It illustrates the domestic 
needs of Vietnam that led to reform and foreign trade. This chapter also traces back relevant 
documents that contain the details of Vietnam foreign policy. Thailand’s policy of “turning the 
battlefield into a market place” is also examined. The chapter then discusses the political and 
economic relations between Thailand and Vietnam. 
 Chapter 3 discusses Vietnam relations with the major powers, ASEAN, and sub-regional 
organizations. The chapter examines Vietnam relations with the major powers: the Soviet Union, 
China, the United States, and Japan. It traces efforts to establish regional organizations before 
ASEAN. It also demonstrates differences between those efforts and ASEAN that are important to 
Thailand and Vietnam relations. It looks into Thailand’s role in helping Vietnam engage with 
ASEAN and their cooperation in sub-regional organizations.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
HISTORY OF THAILAND-VIETNAM RELATIONS 
This chapter gives background on Thailand-Vietnam relations before the 1990s. It traces 
Thailand-Vietnam relations from 1946. At that time, Thailand was led by Pridi Phanomyong 
who supported independent movements. When the military came into power in 1947, Thailand 
sided with the United States against Communism. When the Communists won the war in 1975, 
negotiations between Thailand and Vietnam to establish diplomatic relations took place and 
succeeded on August 6, 1976. However, bilateral relations became strained again when Vietnam 
invaded Cambodia at the end of 1978.    
Thailand-Vietnam Relations, 1946-1975 
From March 24, 1946 – August 21, 1946, Thailand was under the leadership of Pridi 
Phanomyong.
1
 Both Vietnamese who fled from French authorities and members of “independent 
movements of the neighboring countries” against France were given support and sanctuary by 
his administration.
2
 In this period, supporting the nationalist movements in Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia was the position of Thailand.
3
 Pridi Phanomyong’s administration supported Vietnam 
in many ways: 
                                                 
1
 Thanyathip Sripana and Trinh Dieu Thin, Wiat kiao nai prathet thai kap khwam samphan thai-wiatnam 
[Viet Kieu in Thailand and Thai-Vietnamese Relationship] (Bangkok: Sathaban echia sueksa, 
Chulalongkorn mahawitthayalai, 2005), 74. 
2
 Ibid., 75. 
3
 Suraphong Chaiyanam, Nayobai khong thai to wiatnam: Nayobai tangprathet thai to prathet phueanban 
nai yuk songkhramyen: Ha karani sueksa priapthiap [Thai Policy towards Vietnam: Thai foreign policy 
towards neighbouring countries during the Cold War period: five cases in comparison] (Bangkok: 
Samnak phim sayam, 2017), 65. 
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1) The “leaders and independent movements” of Vietnam and Lao were protected by his 
administration. In the Northeastern region of Thailand, refuge was provided.
4
  
2) The establishment of the Office of Representative and Office of Vietnam Bureau of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam based in Bangkok was “allowed” by his administration.5 
3) The Viet Minh were supplied with arms by his administration. Because Thailand had 
sovereignty over Battambang in that period, the Thai administration started to use it as the point 
to ship arms to the Viet Minh well before the end of 1946 when the “total war” was launched 
against France by the Viet Minh.
6
 Because of the Thai weapons support, a letter written by Ho 
Chi Minh addressed to the Thai Prime Minster that he would like to call this Vietminh battalion 
the “Battalion of Siam”.7 
4) Pridi initiated the Southeast Asia League
8
 Established on September 8, 1947
9
 with 
headquarter in Bangkok,
10
 the Southeast Asia League, under the leadership of Thailand, aimed to 
                                                 
4
 Suphot Dantrakun, “Naiphon singkapo kap kan aphiwat nai prawattisat lao” [Genereal Singapore and 
Revolution in Lao’s History] (Bangkok: Sathaban witthayasat sangkhom (Prathet thai)), 84, cited in 
Sripana and Trinh, 78-79. 
5
 Sukprida Phanomyong, Ho Chi Minh: Thepphachao phu yang mi lomhaichai [Ho Chi Minh: God who 
still have breath] (Bangkok, Samnakphim mingmit, 2006), 122-123, cited in Theera Nuchpiam, “Boribot 
thang prawatsat khwam samphan thai-wiatnam” [Historical context of  Thai-Vietnam relations], in Thai 
nai saita phueanban [Neighbors’ perceptions of Thailand], eds. Sunet Chutintharanon and Khanidtha 
Kanthawichai (Bangkok: Sun chiaochan chapho thang dan mae khong sueksa Sathaban echia sueksa, 
Chulalongkorn mahawitthayalai, 2013), 201. 
6
 Sukprida Phanomyong, Ho Chi Minh: Thepphachao phu yang mi lomhaichai [Ho Chi Minh: God who 
still have breath] (Bangkok, Samnakphim mingmit, 2006), 126, cited in Nuchpiam, 204. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Sripana and Trinh, 84. 
(Footnoted in the book that this is according to an interview at a private house in Ho Chi Minh City with 
Tran Van Giau who was the former President of the Anti-France Committee of South Vietnam as 
indicated in page 80.) 
9
 Wong Phonnikon, “Nayobai tang prathet thi phueng pratthana lae naeo khwamkhit khong than Pridi 
Phanomyong” [Favorable Foreign Policy and the concept of His Excellency Pridi Phanomyong] 
(Bangkok: Khanakammakan damnoenngan chalong 100 pi chatkan nai Pridi Phanomyong ratthaburut 
awuso, 1999), 24, cited in Sripana and Trinh, 83. 
10
 Sripana and Trinh, 84. 
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promote national independence and peace, and to foster relations between independent countries 
and newly-independent countries in Southeast Asia by serving as liaison.
11
  
However, there was a major shift in Thai policy after 1947 when Field Marshall 
Pibulsongkram became Prime Minister. In exchange for various forms of assistances and 
benefits, Thailand joined the United States in fighting against Communism.  
Thus, the policy to help independent movements against France came to a halt.
12
 The Bao Dai 
Administration was “recognized” by Pibulsongkram Administration on February 24, 1950.13 
Also, the Office of Democratic Republic of Vietnam Representative and the Office of Vietnam 
Bureau were closed by Pibulsongkram.
14
 
The Pibulsongkram administration’s anti-communist policy happened after the 
Communist victory in China and Communist domination in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union.
15
 In the post-1946 period, the policy of the Thai military administration was directly 
shaped by the international politics against the spread of Communism, the Korean War, and the 
Communist victory at Dien bien Phu.
16
 From another angle, it is possible to observe that it was 
national interest, not ideology, that guided Pibulsongkram’s policy and the Thai administration 
from 1947 to 1973.
17
 Given that the United States policy was to give any support to anti-
communist allies, Marshall Pibulsongkram’s willingness to fight the Communists extracted 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., 83-84. 
12
 Chaiyanam, 66. 
13
 Wang Khak Nam, Khwampenma haeng kanphatthana khwamsamphan Thai-Wiatnam (1976-2000) 
[Background on the development of Thai-Vietnam relations (1976-2000)], 1
st
 edition (Bangkok: Hanoi: 
Sathaban echia sueksa, Chulalongkorn mahawitthayalai; Sathan ek-akkhraratchathut na krung Hanoi, 
2007), 39. 
14
 Ibid., 39. 
15
 Sripana and Trinh, 86. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Natasha Hamilton-Hart, Hard Interests, Soft Illusions: Southeast Asia and American Power (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 52-53, cited in Chaiyanam, 40. 
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assistance from the United States.
18
 His political rivals were also purged by General 
Pibulsongkram under the guise of putting an end to the Communists.
19
 
The Second Indochina War involved Thailand after Thailand “recognized” the Republic 
of Vietnam led by Ngo Dinh Diem, which was supported mainly by the United States.
20
 
However, relations between Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam came to an end when South 
Vietnam was defeated by the Communists in April 1975.
21
 It was from 1955-1975 that Thailand 
and North Vietnam were on opposing sides.   
Background on the establishment of Thailand-Vietnam Relations 
On May 22, 1975, soon after the fall of Saigon, Phan Hien Deputy Foreign Minister of 
North Vietnam with his delegation visited Thailand to discuss the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Thailand and Vietnam.
22
 No agreement was reached because of outstanding 
issues that Thailand and Vietnam could not agree on.
23
 The first concerned Vietnamese refugees. 
In the Northeastern region of Thailand, there were around 40,000 Vietnamese migrants whom 
Thailand perceived as a possible security threat. Because there was no longer any war in 
                                                 
18
 Chaiyanam, 39. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam, Pbk. 
ed. (New York, NY: Random House, 2013), 231, 341, 469, 612, 624-630 and 709, .cited in Chaiyanam, 
43-44. 
21
 Chaiyanam, 77. 
22
 Kachatphai Burutphat, Thai kap phueanban nai Indochin [Thai and neighbouring countries in 
Indochina] (Bangkok, Samnak phim Phrae Phitthaya, 1988), 120, cited in Chulacheeb Chinwanno, "Song 
thotsawat khwamsamphan thai-wiatnam chak khwamkhatyaeng nai adit su khwamruammue nai 
patchuban" [Two Decades of Thai-Vietnam Relations from Conflict in the Past to Cooperation in the 
Present], in Khwamsamphan rawang prathet thai kap wiatnam nai thotsawat patchuban lae luthang 
khwamruammue nai anakhot [Thai-Vietnamese Relations in the Present Decade and Prospects for 
Cooperation in the Future], ed. Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, and Department of 
Information, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Thammasat Printing House, 1997), 16-17. 
23
 Chinwanno, 17-18. 
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Vietnam, Thailand’s position was that Vietnam should agree to allow them to return. However, 
no assurance was given by Vietnam.
24
  
The second issue was about the “ownership of aircraft and weapons” held by Thailand.25 
Whilst Vietnam claimed ownership and demanded that Thailand agree with this, Thailand’s 
position was that Thailand would return them after Vietnam and the United States settled who 
really owned them.
26
  
Negotiations to establish diplomatic relations were held again August 3-6, 1976, after 
Vietnam appealed to the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs to discuss these issues in Hanoi.
27
 In 
addition to the unsettled issues on Vietnamese migrants residing in Thailand and the ownership 
of aircraft and weapons,
28
 Thailand and Vietnam also had another disagreement on war 
reparations put forward by Vietnam.
29
 Thailand did not consider that Vietnam won the war; 
therefore, there should be no reparation. Vietnam also did not fully cooperate in clarifying 
Thailand’s claim that there was evidence that the Communist Party in Thailand was given 
assistance by Vietnam.
30
 The breakthrough came when both sides agreed to establish diplomatic 
relations before getting back to the negotiation table on disagreements.
31
 Thailand and Vietnam 
established their diplomatic relations on August 6, 1976. In doing so, both agreed on four 
principles
32
 as follows:  
                                                 
24
 Ibid., 17. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid., 17-18. 
27
 Ibid., 18. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., 19. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Kachatphai Burutphat, Thai kap phueanban nai Indochin [Thai and neighbouring countries in 
Indochina] (Bangkok, Samnak phim Phrae Phitthaya, 1988), 124-125, cited in Chinwanno, 19. 
32
 Chinwanno, 19. 
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1. Respect for each other’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-
aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence. 
2. Not to allow any foreign country to use one’s territory as a base for direct or indirect 
aggression and intervention against the other and against other countries in the region. 
3. Establishment of friendly and good neighbourly relations, economic cooperation and 
cultural exchanges on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Settlement of disputes 
among the countries in the region through negotiation in a spirit of equality, mutual 
understanding and respect.  
4. Development of cooperation among the countries in the region for the building of 
prosperous countries in keeping with each country’s specific conditions, for the benefit of 
genuine independence, peace, and neutrality in Southeast Asia, thereby contributing to 
peace in the world.
33
  
Suraphong Chaiyanam observed that the meeting in 1975 between Thailand and Vietnam, 
represented by Phan Hien, Deputy Foreign Minister of North Vietnam, was the origin of these 4 
principles. The ASEAN principle of Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was 
also represented in principle number 4, although not totally.
34
 There were some differences that 
should be noted. In November 1971, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, ASEAN Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs adopted the ASEAN principle of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 
in Southeast Asia. The gist of this principle was its focus on the role of the countries in Southeast 
Asia to maintain stability in the region instead of hegemonic states from other regions. 
“[R]espect one another’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and not participate in activities 
likely to directly or indirectly threaten the security of another” was another priority of the 
                                                 
33
 Joint Communique cited in Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, and Department of 
Information, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khwamsamphan rawang prathet thai kap wiatnam nai 
thotsawat patchuban lae luthang khwamruammue nai anakhot [Thai-Vietnamese Relations in the Present 
Decade and Prospects for Cooperation in the Future], ed. Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat 
University, and Department of Information, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Thammasat Printing House, 
1997), 244. 
34
 Chaiyanam, 171. 
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ZOPFAN in the region.
35
 Forming camps with hegemonic countries, violating domestic issues of 
other Southeast Asian countries either by “inviting or giving consent,” and taking part in disputes 
of other regions were “encouraged” to be avoided by countries in ASEAN. In addition, any 
military bases from abroad were to be got rid of.
36
 As shown, the 4 principles between Thailand 
and Vietnam mentioned above reflected ZOPFAN in many aspects. However, the principle in 
number 3 also focused on economic and cultural aspects. 
Presumably, because Thailand saw Vietnam as the supporter of communists in Thailand, 
the number one principle regarding the “non-interference” principle aimed to prevent this. On the 
other hand, Vietnam put forward the number two principle concerning the prohibition of “any 
foreign country to use one’s territory as a base,” to prevent what had happened during the 
Second Indochina war, when the United States took advantage of using Thailand’s air and naval 
bases to fight against North Vietnam.  
The ascendance into power of Thanin Kraivichien after a coup d’etat on October 6, 1976, 
slowed down the pace of the progress made in Thailand-Vietnam relations. This was due to his 
“anti-Communist policy”.37 Thailand-Vietnam relations returned on track when General 
Kriangsak Chamanan became Prime Minister in 1977. Normalization of bilateral-relations with 
Vietnam and establishing embassies in the capital cities of Thailand and Vietnam were two of his 
goals.
38
 The visit to Thailand by Pham Van Dong the Prime Minister of Vietnam September 6-
10, 1978 met with great success. Many issues were resolved by the meeting between General 
                                                 
35
 M. Ghazali bin Shafie, “The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia,” Pacific Community 3, no.1 (1971), 115, 
cited in Amitav Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region, Reprint 
edition, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 166-167. 
36
 Heiner Hanggi, “ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept”, Pacific Strategic Paper no.4 (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 25, cited in Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, 167. 
37
 Chinwanno, 21. 
38
 Ibid. 
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Kriangsak Chamanan the Prime Minister of Thailand and Pham Van Dong. On the Vietnamese 
migrants, unlike the stance held by Vietnam earlier, Vietnam’s overture was more cooperative. 
To manage this issue, the establishment a Joint Commission was approved by both sides. As for 
the issue of aircraft and weapons, Vietnam took a very compromising stance. For Vietnam, these 
aircrafts and weapons were no longer important as they were no longer operational. In addition, 
Vietnam also showed its determination to engage constructively with Thailand by offering that 
Thailand keep these aircrafts and weapons. Thailand was also encouraged to ignore this issue.
39
 
However, on December 25, 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Strained relations 
between Thailand and Vietnam returned. In response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, 
Thailand and China forged a closer alliance in opposition to Vietnam.
40
 
  In short, this introduction chapter reveals that before the 1990s, there were times when 
Thailand and Vietnam had good relations. This includes the very supportive Pridi Phanomyong 
administration. However, as explained earlier, because of national interest, not ideology, 
Thailand sided with the United States to fight against Communism. This is important because it 
pushed Thailand and North Vietnam to be in different camps. After the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries, their relations came to a pause for over 10 years 
because of Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia.  
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Ibid., 22. 
40
 Chaiyanam, 184. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THAILAND-VIETNAM RELATIONS IN THE 1990s 
This chapter discusses Thailand-Vietnam relations in the 1990s. It begins by looking 
back at the economic conditions in Vietnam that made economic reform necessary. The 
“macroeconomic crisis” pushed Vietnam to shift from the communist model to the capitalist 
model and opened up the country. It also reviews Vietnam’s foreign policy according to various 
documents from 1986. In addition, this chapter also examines Thailand’s policy of “turning the 
battlefield into a market place”. Finally, the political relations and the economic relations of the 
two countries in the 1990s are discussed.  
Background on Vietnam’s Foreign Policy 
 The “socialist economic model” or the “centrally planned economy” guided North 
Vietnam’s economic policy at the start. Introduced in 1961, the “first official five-year economic 
development plan” or the “First Five-Year Plan” gave the blueprint for North Vietnam’s 
economic development.
41
 The First Five-Year Plan had 4 main goals: Firstly, the “socialist 
transformation” was to be finalized. Secondly, along with improving the industrial and the 
agricultural sectors, heavy industry was at the top of the agenda.  Light industry, food 
processing, and transportation were also given importance. Thirdly, the “economic development” 
and “consolidation of national defense” were to be integrated. “Public order” and “security and 
protection of socialist development” were another focus. Fourthly, the Vietnamese were to foster 
                                                 
41
 Tran Van Hoa, “Vietnam’s Recent Economic Performance and its Impact on Trade and Investment 
Prospects,” in Economic Development and Prospects in the ASEAN : Foreign Investment and Growth in 
Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, ed. Tran Van Hoa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 6. 
   14 
“socialist culture” and “socialist consciousness.”42  Basic industries and capital goods 
productions were the main focus of Vietnam. The Soviet Union and China were the two most 
important countries that provided aid to Vietnam.
43
  Whilst 20% annual increase was the aim for 
industrial production,
44
 only 9% was determined as the aim for agricultural yield.
45
 In 1960, the 
Vietnamese economy was composed of 58.8% agricultural sector and 41.3% industrial sector. In 
1965, 49% of the Vietnamese economy was agricultural sector whilst 51% was industrial 
sector.
46
 However, “the Second Five-Year Plan” could not be carried out because of the 
“bombing campaign” by the United States in 1965.47 In contrast, a “market economic system” 
was followed by South Vietnam beginning in 1954. South Vietnam’s economy also received 
financial support from other countries especially the United States.
48
  
 After unification, from 1976-1985, Vietnam could be described as facing a period of 
“macroeconomic crisis.” There were some changes made in South Vietnam’s economy in order 
to apply the “socialist system” there. The policy to “nationalize the industrial sector” and to 
“collectivize the agricultural sector” was implemented.49 In addition, Vietnam came up with the 
“Second Five-Year Plan (1976-1980)”. Drafted for both North and South Vietnam, this “Five-
                                                 
42
 Kaye, W., “A Bowl of Rice Divided: The Economy of North Vietnam,” The China Quarterly 9, (1962), 
82-93, and Nakano, Y., “Economic Condition in North Viet-Nam,” The Developing Economies 1, no.2, 
(1963), 218-231, cited in Yoon Heo, Nguyen Khanh Doanh, and Tran Nhuan Kien, Trade and 
Development in Contemporary Vietnam: Doi Moi, Trade Reform, and Poverty Reduction (Saarbrucken, 
Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012), 13. 
43
 Yoon, Nguyen, and Tran, 13. 
44
 Nakano, Y., “Economic Condition in North Viet-Nam,” The Developing Economies 1, no.2, (1963), 
218-231, cited in Yoon, Nguyen, and Tran, 13. 
45
 Kaye, W., “A Bowl of Rice Divided: The Economy of North Vietnam,”The China Quarterly 9, (1962), 
82-93, cited in Yoon, Nguyen, and Tran, 13. 
46
 Yoon, Nguyen, and Tran, 13. 
47
 Tran Van Hoa, 6. 
48
 Ibid., 7. 
49
 Ibid. 
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Year Plan” was considered the first of its kind.50 However, the economy of Vietnam failed 
miserably in this timeframe.
51
 The plan set an ambitious goal to reach an “annual growth rate” of 
13-14%.
52
 However, in practice, only 0.4% was reached.
53
  
The second five-year plan proposed to utilize the agricultural sector in South Vietnam to 
support the industrial sector in North Vietnam. It failed miserably because of the opposition of 
farmers in the South to “collectivization”. It also failed because of the low agricultural yields to 
fund industrialization, the effects of the war, and the inaccurate expectation of assistance from 
abroad to help Vietnam revive the country after the war.
54
  
The United States and its allies waged war in North and South Vietnam with different 
goals. On the one hand, the “strategic bombing” was employed in North Vietnam. This meant the 
goal of the bombing was to destroy “transportation capabilities (e.g. airfields, railroads, bridges, 
ports, roads), as well as military barracks, industrial plants, and storage depots.” On the other 
hand, the “interdiction bombing” was the strategy used in South Vietnam. In other words, the 
bombing was used to “disrupt enemy troop movements and support U.S. ground troop 
operations….”55 The disastrous effects for both North and South Vietnam from the bombing 
were that significant portions of infrastructures were destructed as follows: “78 per cent of power 
plants, 12 per cent of maritime ports, 36 per cent of railroad yards, 22 per cent of rail roads, 100 
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per cent of explosive plants, 100 per cent of iron and steel plants, 90 per cent of cement plants, 
23 per cent of airfields, 20 per cent of communication installations and 56 per cent of bridges.”56 
It is complicated to calculate the “cost” of Vietnam’s entanglement in Cambodia since 
the end of 1978. In addition to the spending to back the new administration in Phnom Penh, 
Vietnam lost its sources of income from China both from trade along the border and direct 
assistance. Even worse, Vietnam’s action in Cambodia led to being excluded from international 
trade.
57
 
Misrepresentation of the economy in Vietnam was caused by the new “bureaucratic 
centralized system”.  The State Planning Commission drafted unrealistic production schemes. 
Given that there was a widening gap between official prices and market prices of goods during 
the market cycle, it caused state enterprises to fail, so large state subsidies were offered to save 
them. Because state enterprises were supplied with raw materials, their prices were pre-
determined. This misrepresented the actual market price. However, it turned out that because the 
price of products were artificially fixed, they fell prey to companies and some state enterprises 
that took advantage of this condition and made a profit in the illegal market.
58
 
 A grave economic crisis loomed for Vietnam by the end of the 1970s. There were 
negative growth rates in 1979 and 1980. Food grain production dropped. As much as 8-9 million 
tons of food was imported to Vietnam from 1976-1980 to serve domestic demand. The small rise 
of 6.45% of food production was mismatched with the 9.27% of population growth.
59
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 As a consequence of the macroeconomic crisis, Vietnam decided to liberalize the 
economy, a solution put forward by the “Fifth Plenum” (“Fourth Party Congress”) in July 1979. 
The shift in economic policy was considered “microeconomic reforms” by “free market” 
economists. This policy ended the production and distribution prohibition in the agricultural 
sector, making it the sector with the biggest shift. The “three points contract” was implemented 
instead. Instead of farm cooperatives, households became the main medium to do the farming. 
The households agreed to receive land for a short period to farm. The designated amount and 
price of output must be sold to state trading agencies. The agricultural tax must also be paid. 
Then the household unit had the freedom to do anything with their farming surplus.
60
 After 1979, 
this initiative proved to be successful as agricultural production rose steadily.
61
 
 The manufacturing sector also adopted a new initiative under the “Third Five-Year Plan 
(1981-1985)”. Instead of an assigned budget from the state, state enterprises were to look for 
capital from elsewhere. Then some amount of the products could be sold at open market prices 
instead of state regulated prices. This plan was very successful given the increase in national 
income of 6.4% in 1981-1985.
62
  At the same time, agricultural production rose to 5.2% and 
manufacturing production rose to 9.5% annually. 
63
  
 After 1986 Vietnamese foreign policy began to change. Vietnam became more open to 
trade with foreign countries regardless of political ideology. To understand Vietnamese foreign 
policy in the 1990s, I examined important Vietnamese documents from 1986 to 2000 as follows: 
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Political Report of the 6
th
 Party Congress in 1986,
64
 Resolution No.32 adopted at the Politburo 
Communist Party of Vietnam in June 1986,
65
 Resolution No.13 adopted at the 6
th
 Politburo in 
May 1988,
66
 “The Strategy for Socio-Economic Stability and Development until 2000,”67 and the 
Political Report of the 8
th
 Party Congress.
68
  
The 6
th
 Party Congress in 1986 
One of the turning points in Vietnam was the death of Le Duan in 1986. To liberalize 
restrictions on markets, religion, cultural activities, and media was the preference of Nguyen Van 
Linh, who had views different from Le Duan. The conflict between Le Duan and Nguyen Van 
Linh because of the different ways they dealt with economic and cultural issues was revealed in 
the mid 1980s. Later, the “Doi Moi policy” was formulated by Nguyen Van Linh.69 The Doi Moi 
policy was adopted at the 6
th
 national party congress in December 1986. The policy was to shift 
to a capital market economy instead of a state planned economy in order to fix Vietnam’s 
economic crisis. In addition, investment from abroad was also a priority for Vietnam.
70
 Since 
1987, Vietnam became more open to international trade.
71
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 Two important points were indicated as never before in the Political Report of the 6
th
 
party Congress in 1986. The first point was to engage with Southeast Asian countries more 
cordially. The second point was to be more compromising on the regional conflict that Vietnam 
indirectly referred to the Cambodian conflict.
72
 Resolution No.32 was adopted at the Politburo 
meeting in June 1986.
73
 In the aftermath of the war, the new direction of Vietnamese foreign 
policy could be traced in this resolution. The necessity that the conflict in Cambodia be settled 
“on the basis of peace and respect for Cambodia's independence and sovereignty” was 
indicated.
74
 This new foreign policy also lessened the tension between Thailand and Vietnam. 
The 6
th
 Politburo 
 Later in May 1988, the 6
th
 Politburo assembly adopted Resolution No.13.
75
 The 
resolution stipulated a “multi-directional foreign policy orientation,”76 more collaboration with 
countries in the region and the establishment of the “comprehensive Southeast Asia policy.”77 
Instead of the contestation between the “socialist” and the “capitalist” regimes, the so-called idea 
of the “who wins over who,” the new idea of “comprehensive security” was initiated by 
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Resolution No.13. In sum, the resolution outlined a foreign policy that would provide Vietnam 
with: “a strong economy, adequate defense, and diplomacy for expanded cooperation.”78 
The 7
th
 Party Congress 
 Resolution No.13 adopted at the 6
th
 Politburo in 1988
79
 and the “multi-directional foreign 
policy” led to a new foreign policy called “Vietnam wants to befriend all countries in the 
international community and to strive for peace, independence, and development,” adopted in 
June 1991 at the 7th National Party Congress.
80
 Also, a “Strategy for Socio-Economic Stability 
and Development until 2000” was adopted to carry out a “multilateral foreign policy.”81 
According to this strategy, Vietnam would ignore “socio-political systems” and, instead, foster 
economic relations with the international community under the theme “multi-lateralization and 
diversification.”82 
The 8
th
 Party Congress 
 The 8
th
 Party Congress was held in June 1996.
83
 Despite the reforms mentioned earlier, 
there emerged some opposition. In fact, Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN and normalization of 
relations with the United States became quite controversial.
84
  
 Since the downfall of the Soviet Union, ideological conservatives in Vietnam 
continuously repeated that “peaceful evolution” is endangering Vietnam.85 Towards the end of 
the 1970s, China introduced the nefarious concept of “peaceful evolution.” This concept was 
                                                 
78
 Ibid., 57. 
79
 Ibid., 56. 
80
 Sripana, 57. 
81
 Quang, 69. 
82
 Ibid. 
83
 Achara Ashayagachat, “Time for Soul Searching,” the Bangkok Post, December 27, 1996. Factiva.   
84
 Thayer, “Vietnamese Foreign Policy: Multilateralism and the Threat of Peaceful Evolution,” 10.  
85
 Ibid., 16. 
   21 
also adopted by Vietnam to refer to a pending imperialist plot. It was in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union that this plot eroded Communism.
86
 The concept held that capitalism and socialism 
have to continue to fight till one side is subdued.
87
 
 It was in 1993-1994 that the Chinese concept of “peaceful evolution” was embraced by 
the Vietnamese “military.”88 Initially mentioned in 1994, the “four dangers”89 were identified as 
“the danger of falling further behind economically, the danger of deviating from the socialist 
direction, the scourge of corruption and mandarinism, and the plot and ‘peaceful evolution’ 
activities carried out by enemy forces.”90 The party documents of the “1996 Eighth Party 
Congress” formally recorded these “four dangers.” Because the reform process consisted of both 
risks and opportunities, it was important to find the right equilibrium. The “four dangers” could 
help with that.
91
  
 A classified memorandum was formulated in August 1995 by Vo Van Kiet a Politburo 
member and the Prime Minister of Vietnam.
92
 There were many issues covered in this 
memorandum. In foreign relations, there were two significant successes: normalization of 
Vietnam-United States relations, and Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN.93  
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 When this memorandum was distributed to the Politburo, it received a negative response 
from the conservatives. A document the conservatives produced was called “American Strategies 
to Transform Socialist Vietnam After the Normalization of United States-Vietnam Relations.”94 
It disagreed with Kiet’s memorandum and insisted that becoming an ASEAN member and 
normalizing relations with the United States was a plot to weaken Vietnam.
95
 The United States 
wanted to stir up “democratic forces” by promoting political and economic freedom, controlling 
the Vietnamese market, and giving assistance to the party’s opposition. The conservatives 
viewed that the United States wanted to weaken the authority of the Vietnamese Communist 
Party.
96
 
 Despite opposition from the conservatives, the 8
th
 Congress endorsed a political report 
that included ASEAN as a cornerstone of Vietnamese foreign policy. Vietnam did not give much 
emphasis to this at first, but because of the advocacy of ASEAN ambassadors in Hanoi, ASEAN 
was mentioned in the report.
97
 Among the five key goals of Vietnam foreign policy, number two 
stated that:
98
  
To do our utmost to increase our relations with neighbouring countries and other ASEAN 
members, constantly consolidate relations with traditional friendly countries, attach 
importance to relations with developed countries and economic-political centers of the 
world, at the same time upholding all the time the spirit of fraternal solidarity with 
developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Non-Aligned Movement.
99
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 Thanyathip Sripana, a senior researcher at the Institute of Asian Studies at Chulalongkorn 
University,
100
 observed that the term in the political reports shifted from Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine to a capitalist tone in the 6
th
 to 9
th
 Party Congresses.
101
 Reviewing the 6
th
 to 8
th
 Party 
Congress mentioned earlier, this study found this observation to be accurate. Because of 
Vietnam’s economic crisis, Vietnam tried to launch economic reforms and to open up to foreign 
countries for economic opportunities. Thanyathip also explained that, after 1986, although 
Thailand was not mentioned in the foreign policy of Vietnam, Thailand was included in 
Vietnam’s strategy towards ASEAN. In addition, there were some positive overtures that 
revealed Vietnam determination’s to foster good relations with Thailand regardless of the fact 
that the Cambodian problem had yet to be settled. First, the attempt of Laos in “building 
understanding and mutual confidence with Thailand” was acknowledged by the Political Report 
of the 6
th
 Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1986.
102
 Regardless of Thailand’s 
uncompromising position towards Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, Vietnam’s acceptance of 
relations between Thailand and Laos implied improvement in how Vietnam saw Thailand. 
Vietnam’s position on relations with Thailand was also re-considered.103 Secondly, in August 
1989, Nguyen Co Thach the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam published an article “All for 
peace, national independence and development,” which revealed his positive attitude towards the 
Thai policy of “turning Indochina from a battlefield into a market place”.104 This indicated that 
rapprochement between Thailand and Vietnam was a new goal in Vietnam’s foreign policy. This 
new policy led to exchange visits: in October 1991, Vo Van Kiet Prime Minister of Vietnam paid 
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a visit to Thailand to call on Anand Panyarachun the Prime Minister of Thailand who later in 
January 1992 paid a return visit to Vietnam.
105
    
 In short, beginning in 1986, Vietnam’s foreign policy became more open to all countries 
by prioritizing economic cooperation over political ideology. There were also attempts to apply a 
more capitalist approach to Vietnam’s economy. Though there was some opposition to reform in 
Vietnam, especially on normalization with the United States and Vietnam’s ASEAN 
membership, Vietnam still put ASEAN on the agenda in an official document. This also opened 
up an opportunity for Thailand and Vietnam to normalize diplomatic relations.  
Background on Thailand’s Foreign Policy 
Turning Battlefield into Marketplace/ Less Focus on Communist Threat Under Chatichai 
Choonhavan 
 Chatichai Choonhavan, the Thai Prime Minister from 1988 to 1991,
106
 announced the 
policy of “turning the Indochina battlefields into market places” given the domestic economic 
policy shift in Vietnam.
107
 It was because of this policy and the resolution of the Cambodia 
problem that Thailand and Vietnam resumed their diplomatic relations. In 1989, all Vietnamese 
troops pulled out of Cambodia. The United Nations intervened in Cambodia at the beginning of 
the 1990s to prepare a ceasefire and elections.
108
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Earlier, during 1980-1988, General Prem Tinsulanonda
109
 led Thailand as Prime 
Minister. During his tenure, Siddhi Savetsila the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand and 
Prasong Soonsiri the head of the National Security Council played critical roles in Thai foreign 
policy towards the Cambodian conflict.
110
 Political, economic, and military means were used to 
try to force Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia.
111
 In contrast to Prem and his 
advisors, Chatichai Choonhavan had many work experiences in different occupations: soldier, 
diplomat, politician, and businessman.
112
 He was familiar with foreign relations because he had 
worked as military attaché, charge d’affaires, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. As a result Chatichai Choonhavan had been highly involved in 
shaping Thailand foreign policy. In addition, he also received assistance from a group of foreign 
policy consultants,
113
 namely Kraisak Choonhavan, M.R. Sukhumphan Boriphat, Pansak 
Vinyaratn, Surakiart Sathirathai, Borwornsak Uwanno, Chuanchai Atchanan, and Narongchai 
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Akrasanee.
114
 Because of this, a more moderate approach towards the Cambodian conflict was 
chosen by the Chatichai Choonhavan administration.
115
.  
 On August 25, 1988, Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan addressed the Parliament 
about his government’s new foreign policy.116 One of the principal policies was:  
to adjust both economic and political relations with neighboring countries, particularly 
the expansion of trade and the promotion of good understanding and friendship with a 
view to bringing about peaceful and harmonious coexistence on the basis of mutual 
benefits, and endeavor to promote the settlement of regional and international problems 
through political and diplomatic means.
117
  
 The speech above showed that the Chatichai Choonhavan administration wanted to 
improve relations with Vietnam by focusing on economic cooperation and putting an end to the 
Cambodian problem. In addition, this argument was also expressed by Foreign Minister Siddhi 
Savetsila who stated that “under the new government, Thailand's foreign policy regarding the 
major powers and neighboring countries will be balanced and more flexible, based on mutual 
interest. There will be changes in both political and economic policies towards neighboring 
countries in order to enhance understanding and ensure peace and security in the region.”118  
Given that at the end of the Cold War foreign relations focused more on economic issues, 
Thailand’s foreign policy under Chatichai Choonhavan shifted from security to trade.119 Unlike 
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what a number of intellectuals claimed, it was not merely about trying to deal with neighboring 
countries to exploit natural resources.
120
 From the beginning of the 1960s, the economic 
direction toward industrialization in Thailand also dictated this shift in policy.
121
 The export 
industries that became prominent in the 1980s were especially important.
122
 Thailand became 
part of the global economy as industrialization grew. For economic growth in Thailand to be 
stable, Thailand had to be competitive internationally. Foreign investments now came into play 
to help the economy in Thailand to grow continuously.
123
 Chatichai Choonhavan managed to 
tailor his policy to adjust Thailand’s political economy to cope with globalization.  This policy 
was appropriate. Because of its attractiveness, it was adopted by the following administrations 
under Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun and Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai.
124
                               
  The analysis above reveals that the new Thai economic policy was quite effective in 
terms of economic benefits Thailand received. In terms of relations between Thailand and 
Vietnam, it met with great success because without this policy, there could be hardly any 
positive interaction between the two countries. Nevertheless, as we shall see later, the end of the 
Cambodian dispute also was an important factor in ameliorating relations between Thailand and 
Vietnam. The timing was also good because in this period, Vietnam had domestic needs that 
forced it to engage with the outside world. At the same time, Thailand also had a new leader who 
understood the importance of a new policy of engagement and initiated a new economic policy 
that put an end to the conflict and replaced it with trade.  
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Thailand-Vietnam Relations 
Thailand-Vietnam Political Relations 
First Half of the 1990s 
 After the Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia, Thailand-Vietnam relations 
became more cordial.
125
 In 1989, it was the first time in thirty years that Thailand appointed trade 
representatives to make a visit to Vietnam.
126
 On October 27-30, 1990, Nguyen Co Thach, 
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Vietnam paid an official visit to Thailand. A 
Prime Minister-level summit meeting between the two countries was suggested by Thach so that 
their relations could be normalized. He also raised the issue that “Thailand could play a leading 
role in regional cooperation” as Vietnam wanted to engage with other countries in Southeast 
Asia. He even mentioned that this plan for “regional cooperation” could begin regardless of the 
ongoing Cambodian problem. A scheme to re-establish the 1978 Joint Commission was also put 
forward by Thach. According to him, this would promote the bilateral economic and socio-
cultural cooperation.
127
 It would revitalize their cooperation that existed before Vietnam marched 
into Cambodia, which caused strain relations. This Vietnamese call for assistance from Thailand 
as a conduit to other countries showed that Thailand’s new foreign policy as the conduit was well 
accepted by Vietnam. The end of the third Indochina conflict and the new Thai administration 
under Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan paved the way for the new chapter in Thailand-
Vietnam relations.   
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Following Nguyen Co Thach’s visit April 19-24, 1991, another official visit to Thailand 
was made by Le Mai the Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam. The plan to organize the first 
Prime Minister-level summit of the two countries was discussed. In addition, the agreement to 
form a “Ministerial-Level Joint Commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation” was 
reached.
128
 During September 15-17, 1991, an official visit to Vietnam was made by Arsa 
Sarasin, the Thai Foreign Minister. Subsequently, an agreement to establish a “Joint 
Commission” was signed by both parties.129 This revealed that the two countries were heading 
into closer relations.  
 In addition to the “Joint Commission,” Thailand and Vietnam continued their exchange 
of visits, which led to more agreements. “Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments” and “Memorandum of Understanding on the Cooperation in Energy and Oil” were 
later “signed” during Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet’s visit to Thailand October 28-31, 1991. This 
strengthened the ties between the two countries even more.
130
 
During January 15-17, 1992, Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun paid an official visit to 
Vietnam marking the first Thailand government leader’s visit since the two countries had 
diplomatic ties.
131
 The two most notable outcomes of his visit were: the agreement by both sides 
to set up Consulate-Generals, and the completion of the Protocol Amending the 1978 Agreement 
on Trade, Economic, and Technical Cooperation.
132
 On September 14, 1992, the Royal Thai 
Consulate-General in Ho Chi Minh City opened. In addition to “consular services”, it also 
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worked to enhance trade and investment between Thailand and Vietnam.
133
 According to the 
Bangkok Post newspaper, when Anand Panyarachun the Prime Minister of Thailand was to visit 
Vietnam, both parties would approve the revisions to the Accord in 1978 by removing two 
points: the “list of strategic goods” and a “joint trade committee.” Given the transformation in 
the Southeast Asian region, these revisions were necessary to keep the agreement up-to-date.
134
 
According to Vo Van Kiet the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Anand Panyarachun’s visit to 
Vietnam “Opened a new era in Vietnamese-Thai relations.”135 
The visit to Vietnam by Foreign Minister Prasong Soonsiri December 23-25, 1992, 
focused on “economic and trade” matters. Two agreements were signed during that visit. The 
first agreement was on “long term credit” worth 6 million US dollars to enable Vietnam to 
purchase “consumer goods and basic public utility from Thailand.” The second agreement was 
on “overlapping tax” exemption.136 In many instances, investors who invest abroad had to pay 
taxes to more than one country as a result of the way different countries tax. In addition to the 
country of residence, an investor might also have to pay taxes for the country where the profit 
was made. Vietnam’s Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAAs) with other states tried 
to address this problem. The agreements tried to remove these taxes by determining two cases: 
firstly, cases that taxes could be exempted or, secondly, cases that the “taxes payable in 
Vietnam” could be decreased. This was basically about getting rid of double taxation.137  For 
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instance, for a company in the shipping or air transport sector, only one country could tax its 
income. In other words, either the country where the company was located or the country where 
the company’s offices running the business were located could tax the company.138 
 As we have seen, the frequent exchange of visits led to many important agreements. In 
the first half of the 1990s, Thailand and Vietnam focused on economic cooperation. The new 
policy focusing on economic cooperation created a channel for Thailand and Vietnam to foster 
friendlier relations. Many of the agreements in this period were on trade and investment, as 
shown in the table below. This helped strengthen the relations between the two countries. 
Economic cooperation replaced the conflict of the two countries.  
                                                 
138
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Table 1: Agreements between Thailand and Vietnam from 1991-1995 
Year: Agreement: 
1991 
 
1) Agreement on the Establish of the Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation 
2) Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
3) Memorandum of Understanding on the Cooperation in the Natural Gas Industry 
1992 1) Protocol Amendments of the Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation 
2) Agreement on a Long-Term Credit 
3) Cooperation Agreement between the Office of the BOI of the Kingdom of Thailand and the 
State Committee for Cooperation and Investment of the SRV 
4) Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Cooperation in Rice Production and Exportation 
5) Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income 
6) Co-operation Agreement between the Office of the Board of Investment of the Kingdom of 
Thailand and the State Committee for Co-operation and Investment of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam 
1993 1) Joint Cooperation Agreement between Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Vietnam and 
the Board of Trade of Thailand 
1994 1) Agreement on Tourism Cooperation between Thailand and Vietnam 
2) Agreement on Cooperation between Industrial Association of Thailand and Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of Vietnam 
   32 
 
Reference: “Khwam toklong rawang thai kap wiatnam” [Agreements between Thailand and 
Vietnam] East Asia Watch, accessed February 22, 2018, 
http://www.eastasiawatch.in.th/th/agreement/47/  
 
 Second Half of the 1990s 
By the end of the 1990s, Thailand and Vietnam managed to reach agreements on 
important issues that were in areas other than on economic cooperation. These were especially 
those relevant to the maritime boundary, visa exemption, and Vietnamese migrants. See table 2 
below, Thailand and Vietnam also signed the Agreement between the Government of the 
Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand 
(1997), the Memorandum of Understanding between the Royal Thai Navy and the Vietnamese 
Navy on Joint Patrol Procedures in the Adjacent Maritime Areas and Establishment of Lines of 
Communication (1999), and the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of 
Thailand and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Visa Exemption for 
Holders of Ordinary Passports (2000).
139
  
However, it should be noted that in 1995, both Thailand and Vietnam had already agreed 
on the Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles and Arrangements Relating to 
Repatriation of Vietnamese Non-Refugees from the Kingdom of Thailand as shown in table 1. 
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1995 1) Agreement between the Ministry of Finance of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Ministry of 
Finance of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the Joint Subcommittee on Finance 
2)  Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles and Arrangements Relating to Repatriation 
of Vietnamese Non-Refugees from the Kingdom of Thailand 
3)  Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin 
 
* There was an agreements reached in 1995 that was not very relevant to economic cooperation: 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles and Arrangements Relating to Repatriation of 
Vietnamese Non-Refugees from the Kingdom of Thailand 
   33 
 
Reference: “Khwam toklong rawang thai kap wiatnam” [Agreements between Thailand and 
Vietnam] East Asia Watch, accessed February 22, 2018, 
http://www.eastasiawatch.in.th/th/agreement/47/  
 
Among other visits by Vietnamese leaders to Thailand, on October 6-8, 1998, Tran Duc 
Loung, President of Vietnam, made a state visit to Thailand at the invitation of the King and 
Queen marking the first president of Vietnam to visit Thailand since the two countries had 
diplomatic ties.
140
 This visit also led to the signing of the Agreement on Legal and Judicial 
Cooperation and the Agreement on Cooperation Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and 
Precursor Chemicals Control.
141
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Table 2: Agreements between Thailand and Vietnam from 1996-2000 
Year: Agreement: 
1996 1) Cultural Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government 
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
1997 1) Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Scientific, Technological and Environmental Cooperation 
2) Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Mutual Exemption of Visas for Holders of Diplomatic and 
Official Passports and Visas Facilitation for Ordinary Passports 
3) Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between the Two 
Countries in the Gulf of Thailand 
1998 1) Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Legal and Judicial Cooperation 
2) Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the Cooperation in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances 
and Precursor Chemicals Control 
1999 1) Memorandum of Understanding between the Royal Thai Navy and the Vietnamese Navy on 
Joint Patrol Procedures in the Adjacent Maritime Areas and Establishment of Lines of 
Communication 
2) Memorandum of Understanding between Radio Thailand, the Public Relations Department and 
Radio the Voice of Vietnam on Cooperation in Radio Broadcasting 
2000 1) Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Visa Exemption for Holders of Ordinary Passports 
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As mentioned earlier, in the second half of the 1990s, the success in reaching agreements 
on Vietnamese non-refugees, maritime demarcation, and visa exemption improved Thailand-
Vietnam relations to a new level. Under the administration of Prime Minister Anand 
Punyarachun, “second-generation” Vietnamese residing in Thailand were granted Thai 
citizenship instead of being sent back to Vietnam. To Vietnam, this new move indicated the 
frankness and confidence that Thailand had in Vietnam.
142
 Aside from other matters, Vietnam 
saw the Vietnamese migrant issue as a way to foster closer Thailand-Vietnam relations.
143
  
In August 1997, the agreement on “maritime demarcation in the Gulf of Thailand” was 
reached by Thailand and Vietnam.
144
 The conflict on maritime issue was the main obstacle in the 
Ministerial Meeting of the Thai-Vietnamese Joint Commission (JC). However, after many 
political issues were settled especially on the maritime demarcation, the two countries turned 
more fully to economic cooperation.
145
 
According to the agreement between Thailand and Vietnam on visa requirements, 
travelers with Vietnamese passports were exempted from visa-check and could stay in Thailand 
for 30 days.
146
 According to the Prime Minister’s Office in charge of tourism, the Tourism 
Authority of Thailand had already made this agreement with Cambodia, Laos, and Burma. 
Vietnam was the last country among this group of countries to make this agreement with 
Thailand.
147
 This group of country made the idea “Suwannabhumi” (“Golden Land”) for tourism 
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possible. In other words, the aspiration to bring back the idea of “tourism in Southeast Asia” was 
possible after Vietnam took part in this collective effort.
148
 
The bilateral relations between Thailand and Vietnam were further enhanced when they 
cooperated on cultural issues in addition to political and economic issues. In 1996, the 
“Agreement to promote cultural cooperation” was signed by Thailand and Vietnam. Cooperation 
in this agreement covered “literature, education and research, mass media, youth, sports and 
religion.” For Vietnam, it was considered the first agreement of this kind made with a country in 
Southeast Asia. For Thailand, it was the second. Before this, Thailand had signed similar 
agreement with the Philippines. According to the Vietnamese Culture and Information Minister,“ 
the agreement will provide our two peoples with a firm basis for closer and wider cooperation in 
the cultural field, thus paving the way for the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation in 
other areas.”149 
In addition, Thailand also played a crucial role in giving Vietnam technical support. In 
the past, Thailand had secured a budget of around 20-30 million baht dedicated for other 
countries as financial aid. However, in 1992, under the leadership of Anand Panyarachun, the 
Prime Minister of Thailand, the budget rose to 175 million baht. Countries in Indochina and 
Burma were countries that this aid was intended to support.
150
 Since 1992, Vietnam has officially 
received aid from Thailand.
151
 At that time, 19 million baht were given to Vietnam.
152
 There was 
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a breakthrough in 1994 when “Thailand-Vietnam Country Programme for Development Co-
operation 1995-1997” and “Minutes of Discussion on Vietnam-Thailand Development 
Cooperation Programme” were signed.153 This made aid to Vietnam from Thailand more 
systematic.
154
 The pledges of aid for Vietnam for the Country Programme in this first phase was 
150 million baht and focused on: education, health, agriculture, transport, and industry. Later, in 
1997, the second phase of the Country Programme (1998-2000) was approved. Science and 
technology, tourism, and narcotics were the three new areas included in this new phase.
155
 
“Modernization” in Vietnam was enhanced by its cooperation with Thailand on science, 
technology and environment. The cooperation in this area was significantly promoted by the 
1997 Agreement on Scientific, Technological, and Environmental Cooperation between Thailand 
and Vietnam. There were many initiatives underway between the two countries in this field, such 
as “meteorology, hydrography, postharvest technology, biotechnology, training and development 
of scientific and technological information personnel of Vietnam, industrial patent, oil spills 
prevention, and management, etc.”156    
The relations between Thailand and Vietnam expanded into a wide variety of areas. The 
history of their relations was also important and became a symbol of their friendship. According 
to the Bangkok Post newspaper, in 2000, Phan Van Khai, Prime Minister of Vietnam, traveled to 
a village that Ho Chi Minh used to reside called Ban Na Jok. Since August 1976 when Thailand 
and Vietnam established their ties, there had been no other Vietnamese leader who traveled there 
but Khai. He was welcomed by the local Vietnamese. In addition to the 100-year-old shrine or 
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Dai Vuong, the place where Ho Chi Minh stayed was also visited. At the back of this place, Khai 
planted a banyan tree. He also met with villagers. The newspaper noted that a statement in 
Vietnamese was made by Khai that “Ban Na Jok and the shrine would be eternal symbols of 
Thai-Vietnamese friendship.”157 
 There were many royal and official visits from Thailand to Vietnam as well as official 
visits from Vietnam to Thailand between 1990-2000. For the royal family, there were visits by 
His Royal Highness Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn (in 1992 and in 1997 when His Royal 
Highness Crown Prince piloted his personal plane), Her Royal Highness Princess Maha Chakri 
Sirindhorn (1993, 2000), Her Royal Highness Princess Galyani Vadhana Krom Luang 
Naradhiwas Rajanagarindra (1994), and Her Royal Highness Princess Chulabhorn (1998). There 
were also visits by Thai Prime Ministers: Anand Panyarachun (1992), Chuan Leekpai (1994), 
Banharn Silpa-archa (1995), and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (1997). As for the Vietnam side, 
President Tran Duc Luong made a state visit in 1998. There were also official visits by Prime 
Minister Vo Van Kiet (1991) and Prime Minister Phan Van Khai (2000).
158
 The visits by the 
Thai Royal family and the Thai head of administration as well as the high-level visits by 
Vietnamese showed the close ties between the two countries. 
Thailand-Vietnam Economic Relations 
Political and social issues were the main obstacle that hindered trade between Thailand 
and Vietnam during 1980-1988.
159
 From 1985-1990, trade between Thailand and Vietnam 
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increased dramatically because of changes in both Thailand and Vietnam.
160
 Under the fast-
growing economy in Thailand between 1987-1988, exports increased and domestic production 
required a higher amount of raw materials.
161
 As for Vietnam, there was a dramatic shift in many 
areas under the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in December, 
1986.
162
 As a consequence, to fulfill other objectives, the widening of economic relation with 
foreign countries became a priority.
163
 
 As mentioned earlier, the new policy of Chatichai Choonhavan was announced in 1988 
so it is worth looking at the trade volume between Thailand and Vietnam thereafter. There were 
substantial “economic links” between Thailand and the Indochinese countries and “Thailand and 
Vietnam agreed to set up a joint commission for economic and trade cooperation in December 
1989.”164 Comparing the trade between Thailand and Vietnam in 1988 and in 1990, there was a 
significant increase with the volume of 350.2 million baht in 1988 to 2,862.7 million baht in 
1990.
165
 According to tables 3 and 4 below, the total trade value between Thailand and Vietnam 
continued to increase each year from 1990 to 2000. According to table 3, in 1990 the total 
bilateral trade value was only 69.42 million US dollars. It then skyrocketed to 508.87 million US 
dollars in 1995. 
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Table 3: Thailand-Vietnam Trade Relations 1990-1995 (In million US dollars)  
 
 
 
 
* Please note that this table is from Vietnam’s perspective. 
Reference: Vietnam Customs Hanoi 2002 cited in Wang Khak Nam, Khwampenma haeng 
kanphatthana khwamsamphan Thai-Wiatnam, 1976-2000[Background on the improvement of 
Thai-Vietnam relations, 1976-2000] (Krung Thep : Hanoi: Sathaban Echiasuksa, 
Chulalongkonmahawitthayalai ; Sathan Ekakkhraratchathut na Krung Hanoi, 2550), 158. 
There were a small number of countries that initially invest in Vietnam and Thailand was 
one of them.
166
 Thailand invested in Vietnam 455 million US dollars, making Thailand the 13
th
 
top country to invest in Vietnam in December 1995.
167
 
Table 4: Thailand-Vietnam Trade Relations 1995-2000 (In million US dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
* Please note that this table is from Vietnam’s perspective. 
Reference: Vietnam Customs Hanoi 2002 cited in Wang Khak Nam, Khwampenma haeng 
kanphatthana khwamsamphan Thai-Wiatnam, 1976-2000[Background on the improvement of 
Thai-Vietnam relations, 1976-2000] (Krung Thep : Hanoi: Sathaban Echiasuksa, 
Chulalongkonmahawitthayalai ; Sathan Ekakkhraratchathut na Krung Hanoi, 2550), 196. 
 
Thailand and Vietnam set the target of trade value between the two countries to be 1,000 
million US dollars by 1997. However, this target was not met because of the Asian financial 
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 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Export 52.34 57.75 71.50 71.67 39.41 42.95 
Import 17.08 14.23 14.22 95.11 255.20 465.92 
Trade Balance 35.06 43.52 57.28 -23.44 -215.79 -422.97 
Total Value 69.42 71.98 112.72 166.78 394.61 508.87 
Growth Rate  3.7% 56.6% 47.9% 76.6% 72.7% 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Export 42.95 66.63 191.07 295.26 312.73 388.90 
Import 465.92 586.54 568.07 673.67 556.26 868.99 
Trade Balance  -422.97 -519.91 -377.00 -78.41 -243.53 -480.09 
Total Value 508.87 653.17 759.14 968.93 868.99 1,201.84 
Growth Rate 72.7% 28.3% 15.3% 27.6% 10.3% 38.3% 
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contagion in 1997.
168
 According to table 4, in 1997, the total trade value between Thailand and 
Vietnam was 759.14 million US dollars. It was not until 2000 that the total trade value between 
the two countries could reach, indeed surpass, the 1,000 million US dollars target. As shown in 
table 4, the total trade value in 2000 was 1,201.84 million US dollars. 
Given the focus on the expansion of the industrial sector, Vietnam imported a large 
amount of materials for production. Vietnam imported the following goods: “ Motorcycles CKD 
and IDK types, plastic resins, many kinds of oil, machinery, spare parts, raw materials, textiles, 
animal skin, iron, various kinds of steel, pharmaceutical drugs,…, computers, electronic circuits, 
cars, chemical fertilizers, etc.”169  
As for exports, a large amount of electric and electronic devices were exported from 
Vietnam. “Electric wires, electric cables, shoes, clothes, computers and gadgets, motorcycles and 
spare parts, plastic productions, productions from milk, and furniture” were the goods that 
Vietnam increasingly exported. In addition, Vietnam also exported the following goods: “raw 
materials and processed agricultural products” which were “crude oil, coal, peanuts, rubber, 
coffee, pepper, tea, aquatic animals, vegetables, and fruits.”170     
There were some challenges in the trade between Thailand and Vietnam. The first 
challenge was the incompatible trade between Thailand and Vietnam. Vietnam had a large trade 
deficit with Thailand for a long period.
171
 The second challenge was that Thailand and Vietnam 
traded in small value with one another. Among trade with other countries, Thailand’s export to 
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Vietnam and Vietnam’s export to Thailand accounted for only 1% and 23%, respectively.172 The 
third challenge was the competition between the two countries resulting from the similarity in 
their products. Some examples of these products were rice, aquatic animals, and textiles. This 
could potentially lead to trade competition, which could affect ties between the two countries.
173
 
In short, this chapter shows that Thailand-Vietnam relations in the 1990s were led by 
economic cooperation. In the 1980s, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia played a big part in poor 
bilateral relations. However, because of the new initiatives both in Thailand and Vietnam, the 
economic cooperation opened up the way for improvement in their relations. Vietnam came to 
the realization first from domestic problems. To solve the economic crisis in Vietnam at the end 
of the 1970s, Vietnam became more flexible and turned toward the market economy. From 1986, 
Vietnam became more open to other countries for economic opportunities. At the same time, 
Thailand reaped gains from Vietnam’s more open economy. In the first half of the 1990s, most 
agreements were about economic cooperation. However, by the second half, there were more 
agreements concerning other issues. The agreements on Vietnamese non-refugees, maritime 
demarcation, and visa-exemption showed the improvement in their relations. In addition, the 
high-level exchange of visits also symbolized their amicable relations. However, I agree with 
Thanyathip that the agreements reached in the 1990s were significant in the foreign relations 
between Thailand and Vietnam. As Thanyathip noted, there must have been elements of 
sympathy, cordial ties, and confidence between Thailand and Vietnam in order to reach these 
agreements in the 1990s. Also in the late 1990s, both countries agreed on solving volatile 
political issues. Vietnamese refugees were granted Thai citizen, and maritime disputes were 
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resolved.
174
 I have clearly shown that during the first half of the 1990s, most agreements reached 
were about economic cooperation. They opened up channels to foster more friendly relations. 
This proved to be successful when years later many issues were also resolved, which led to 
closer ties in other areas. What began with economic cooperation turned into cooperation in 
broader areas after the conflict in Cambodia was resolved.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
VIETNAM RELATIONS WITH MAJOR POWERS, ASEAN, AND                                                
SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
This chapter examines Vietnam relations with the major powers, ASEAN, and sub-
regional organizations. Regarding Vietnamese relations with major powers, we see that Vietnam 
could not rely on the Soviet Union as it did earlier. Trying to approach China also posed a 
“security dilemma” for Vietnam and, in fact, China was not so reliable. The United States also 
did not have diplomatic relations with Vietnam until 1995. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and 
the issue on the prisoner of war and missing in action (POW/MIA) were also reasons that made 
the United States to impose sanctions on Vietnam. As for Japan, many policies were 
implemented that followed the United States leadership. This chapter traces back organizations 
established before ASEAN. These organizations are SEATO and ASA. One important aspect 
that made ASEAN different from ASA and SEATO was ASEAN was considered to be less 
prone to be labeled as Western-oriented. As the major powers were unreliable, Vietnam fostered 
good relations with ASEAN instead. Thailand-Vietnam relations were also enhanced by 
ASEAN. Thailand played a critical role in the relations between Vietnam and ASEAN. Thailand-
Vietnam relations also expanded in the sub-regional organizations, namely the Greater Mekong 
Sub-region (GMS) and the Mekong River Commission (MRC). 
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Relations between Vietnam and the Major Powers 
The Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union had faced the “quintuple loss” in 1989-1991.175 Firstly, the Soviet 
Outer Empire came to an end. As a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA/Comecon) since 1978, Vietnam relied heavily on imports from members of CMEA.
176
 
This accounted for about three quarters of its imports in the middle of the 1980s.
177
 Vietnam had 
to change its trade policy after CMEA ended in mid-1991.
178
 Secondly, the status of the Soviet 
Union as a global hegemon was diminished. This also led to the fall of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, 
which was a military alliance led by the Soviet Union. It served as the balance of power with the 
other superpower in the Western World, even though Vietnam did not join the Warsaw Pact, a 
weaken Soviet Union was not thought to be good for Vietnam.
179
 Thirdly, a lot of the Central 
and Eastern European countries and some former members of the Soviet Union replaced the 
Soviet Communist model with liberal-democratic capitalist economies.
180
 Fourthly, the Soviet 
Union could no longer serve as the model for socialism.
181
 Because Vietnam could not find any 
Communist country that could be its role-model in Europe or Asia, Communism seemed to be at 
a dead end.
182
 Vietnam could not manifestly adopt the Maoist model of China because of its 
enmity with China in the past.  Although there remains the Communist Party in China, in the 
beginning of 1990s, China had also adopted many features of the West both socially and 
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economically. For example, the Chinese government allowed the private leasing of state-owned 
enterprises. This compromised important features of the Maoist model of China.
183
 A model that 
is free from domination by other countries is more appealing for Vietnam because of the past 
experience of Vietnam under colonization.
184
     
The party documents of the 7
th
 congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in June 
1991 touched upon the issue of relations between the Soviet Union and Vietnam very slightly. 
Instead, the Congress adopted a political programme that did not mention anything about the 
relations between the two countries.
185
 According to Michael Williams, “[t]he section on foreign 
policy in the political report, for example, speaks only of relations between Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union ‘being renewed in accordance with the interests of each people’. 7th National 
Congress, p. 89; the Political Programme is even vaguer and talks only of consolidating and 
developing ‘the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with other socialist countries’. 
Ibid., p. 61”186 
 There were also indications from the Soviet Union that it would downgrade the 
importance of relations with Vietnam. The first indication is the statement delivered by 
Gorbachev in Vladivostok in July 1986 and in Krasnoyarsk in September 1988. In 1978, the two 
countries had signed the Treaty of Friendship. Thereafter, they had friendly ties. However, 
Gorbachev’s statements revealed the “new thinking” of its position on Asia. As a consequence, 
Vietnam was not confident that the Soviet Union would be committed to its ties with Vietnam as 
it had been in the past. The second indication is the normalization of relations with China by the 
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Soviet Union in 1989. And the third indication is the intense involvement of the Soviet Union in 
the Security Council on the Cambodian problem.
187
 
China 
 The peace agreement on the Cambodian conflict was reached on October 23, 1991.
188
 
Because of the acceptance of the agreement by Vietnam, it opened the door for normalization of 
relations between Vietnam and China.
189
 Given the downfall of the Soviet Union and no 
diplomatic relations with the United States, Vietnam was more open than China to normalize 
their bilateral relations.
190
 After the end of the Cold War, Vietnam’s security dilemma dictated 
rapprochement with China. To legitimize its Communist rule, Vietnam wanted to have good 
relations with a crucial Communist country like China. However, without the Soviet Union to 
balance China, Vietnam became vulnerable given that China had unsettled territorial conflicts 
with Vietnam. In addition, China’s hugeness and geo-political location were worrisome for 
Vietnam.
191
  
 Following the Tiananmen suppression in June 1989, China was isolated by the 
international community. China was consequently interested in normalizing relations with 
Vietnam. This led to the secret negotiations between Vietnam and China in September 1990 in 
Chengdu.
192
 The outcome of the meeting was more exchanges between the two countries, 
notably when General Vo Nguyen Giap attended the Asian Games in Beijing, China,
193
 in 
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1990.
194
 There were probably many reasons that motivated China to engage with Vietnam. When 
the Cambodia conflict was settled, gaining recognition from Southeast Asian countries became 
the policy that China would pursue like never before since 1949.
195
 This means China was not 
interested in prolonging bad relations with Vietnam, especially when the Cambodian conflict 
was about to be settled.
196
 As such, China saw Vietnam as a part of its strategy to open up 
relations with countries in Southeast Asia. 
 After the Paris Peace Agreement was reached in October 1991, Do Muoi the General 
Secretary of Vietnam and Vo Van Kiet the Prime Minister of Vietnam visited China and on 
November 5, 1991, relations between Vietnam and China were normalized.
197
 In fact, earlier in 
July 1991, General Le Duc Anh, a member of the Vietnamese Politburo, had traveled to China to 
prepare for normalization.
198
 Later in September, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen 
Manh Cam traveled to China again to finalize negotiations.
199
 According to the joint declaration 
of relations between China and Vietnam, “Vietnam-China relations will abide by the principles 
of respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and mutual nonaggression and 
noninterference in each other's internal affairs...Relations between Vietnam and China are not an 
alliance relationship, and will not return to the relationship of the 1950s and 1960s”200 which 
could be interpreted that the relationship between the two countries was not so cordial. In 
addition, there remained the dispute on border demarcation and ownership of the Paracel and 
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Spratly islands.
201
 Vietnam and China still had unsettled territorial claims, which became a 
problem that affected their relations for several years after their normalization in 1991. Not until 
a decade later was this territorial contestation settled.
202
 In addition, although a credit of 14 
million dollars was little, China spent a year after rapprochement to decide to grant it to 
Vietnam.
203
 For Vietnam, the Soviet Union was to a larger extent more reliable than China. To 
have more friendly ties with countries that were not Communist thus was the solution. The 
countries in Southeast Asia and the United States were specifically two of the most important 
targets.
204
   
The United States 
 The United States did not have diplomatic relations with Vietnam until July 11, 1995.
205
   
In the past, there were no regular bilateral ties between the United States and Vietnam. It was not 
until the Paris Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict 
was signed by Vietnam in 1991 that one important impediment to normalization was removed.
206
  
In fact, the United States had a legitimate reason to place an economic embargo on 
Vietnam after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978.
207
 In the period of French colonization in 
Vietnam, some regions of Vietnam were embargoed economically by the United States for the 
first time.
208
 The United States retaliated against Communist states that provided assistance to 
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North Korea and China by suspending the Most Favored Nations (MFN) status as obliged by the 
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.
209
 When Vietnam was split into two parts in 
accordance with the Geneva Accords 1954, the United States still continued to impose an 
embargo on North Vietnam.
210
 After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the United States placed identical 
sanctions on the unified Vietnam.
211
 
 In 1991, the “roadmap for normalization” between the United States and Vietnam was 
announced. It set out “reciprocal steps in the normalization process.” If Vietnam followed this, it 
would gain something in return. However, some analysts deemed this unjust since the United 
States could set its own condition.
212
 
 Under the leadership of Ronald Reagan, the United States demanded that Vietnam pull 
out its troops from Cambodia.
213
 The prisoner of war and missing in action (POW/MIA) and 
other humanitarian issues were the main issues that the United States raised for Vietnam to 
address. The extent of its willingness to work with the United States determined the “pace and 
scope” in their rapprochement.214 It was not until February 3, 1994, that the United States lifted 
the economic embargo on Vietnam.
215
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Japan 
Japan’s foreign policy on Southeast Asia was shown in a speech delivered by Takeo 
Fukuda in Manila in August 1977 known as the “Fukuda Doctrine.” There were three points in 
this doctrine. Firstly, military capability is not the path Japan is pursuing; instead Japan 
advocated for peace. Secondly, Southeast Asia will be engaged by Japan in a way called the 
“heart-to-heart relationship” in all aspects: political, economic, and socio-cultural. Thirdly, ties 
between ASEAN and Indochinese countries will be given support by Japan.
216
  However, the 
Fukuda doctrine could not be carried out if the United States came into disagreement with 
Japan’s new approach to Indochinese countries. Also, this doctrine could not be implemented if 
Japan had to be involved in political or military or entanglements with hegemonic states.
217
 Both 
of these proved to be the case, which caused the failure of the Fukuda doctrine. After 
normalizing relations with China in May 1978, the United States postponed its rapprochement 
with Vietnam.
218
 In addition, the conflict in Indochina was still fragile because of the 
contestation for influence between China and the Soviet Union. By the end of 1977, the Khmer 
Rouge ended relations with North Vietnam. However, the Khmer Rouge was backed by China. 
In the meantime, the Soviet Union was approached by Vietnam. In June 29, 1978, the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) which was led by the Soviet Union accepted 
Vietnamese membership, and on November 3, 1978, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
with the Soviet Union was signed by Vietnam.  Because the local Chinese were not handled well 
by Vietnam during the spring of 1978, it affected ties with China. This led to the postponement 
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of China’s assistance to Vietnam in July 1978.219  Then in December 1978, Vietnam occupied 
Cambodia, and, in February 1979, Vietnam was attacked by China.
220
  
Japan cooperated with the United States in dealing with Vietnam on the Cambodian 
conflict by imposing economic sanctions on Vietnam and by working on the prisoners of war 
and missing in action (POW/MIA) matter. Though the Japanese people did not admire Japanese 
government policy to get involved in the prisoners of war and missing in action (POW/MIA) 
issue, the Japanese government still cooperated with the United States.
221
 Whilst negotiations on 
the Cambodian conflict were in progress, the United States agreed with Japan, in November 
1992, that the suspended Official Development Assistance (ODA) of Japan to Vietnam could be 
revived. It was for commodity loans worth 45.5 billion yen.
222
   
After the Cold War ended, the “Fukuda doctrine,” particularly the concept of trying to 
help Vietnam and Indochinese countries to open their relations with the region, became the 
central policy of Japan once again. In May 1991, Toshiki Kaifu, the Prime Minister of Japan, 
said in Singapore that “true peace and prosperity in entire Southeast Asia would become 
enduring when peace comes back to Indochina and its exchanges with ASEAN expand greatly in 
the future”.223  
Japan’s attempt to implement the “Fukuda doctrine” once again became more obvious by 
October 1991 after the dispute in Cambodia was resolved. In January 1993, the “Forum for 
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Comprehensive Development of Indochina” was put forward by Japan as Prime Minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa stated in Bangkok that:
224
  
The conclusion of the Cambodian Peace Accords opens the way not only to Cambodian 
reconstruction but also to the promotion of the policy of openness by Vietnam and Laos. 
It thus makes it possible for Southeast Asia, which consists of the countries of ASEAN 
and Indochina, to develop as an integral whole. Such development has consistently been 
the goal of Japan’s Indochina policy since 1977, when Prime Minister Fukuda articulated 
in Manila Japan’s policy of contributing to the building of peace and stability in the 
whole of Southeast Asia by expanding the scope of mutual cooperation and 
understanding throughout the region….  
…To this end, I should like to propose establishing a “Forum for Comprehensive 
Development of Indochina”225 
 
Pre-ASEAN Establishment Period 
SEATO 
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was an idea of the United States to 
create a regional alliance that would favour the United States against the Communists. Playing a 
critical role in its creation, the United States at first did not want to take a lead in the creation of a 
regional alliance for fear that it will end up being labeled as an “imperialist intervention.” 
Instead, the United States preferred an indirect support for an alliance with countries in the 
region. However, in the end the United States had to take the lead given the increase of 
Communist domination in Indochina.
226
  
It could also be said that SEATO was an outcome of a debate between the United States 
and the United Kingdom. John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, had been advocating 
for a collective defence treaty in response to Communist belligerence prior to and also during the 
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1954 Geneva Conference whereas the United Kingdom preferred to discuss this after the Geneva 
Conference ended as it might derailed the conference. A non-aggression pact that would cover 
many Asian states, as well as India, was also more preferable to the United Kingdom. Unlike the 
United Kingdom, Dulles opined that any favorable outcome from the conference was unlikely. 
The United States finally decided to form a SEATO without the idea of a non-aggression pact 
favored by the United Kingdom and without the unified field command that the United States 
wanted.
227
  
Established in 1954 under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (The Manila 
Pact), SEATO was composed of eight members: Thailand, the Philippines, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Pakistan.
228
 According to Donald 
Weatherbee: 
The operative heart of the Manila Pact stated that the parties to the treaty recognized that 
aggression by armed attack in the treaty area on a party to the treaty or any state or 
territory unanimously designated by the parties would endanger the peace and safety of 
all. In that event, they would consult to meet the common danger. A separate protocol 
brought Laos, Cambodia, and the “free territory” of Vietnam under the SEATO cover. In 
an understanding to the agreement, the United States stated that the treaty obligations 
only applied to communist aggression.
229
  
 During 1961-1962, the attack by the communist Pathet Lao forces on the neutral Royal 
Lao Government alarmed Thailand. However, SEATO could not come into play because there 
was no unanimity among its members. In the end, a bilateral agreement, the Thanat-Rusk 
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Communique was reached in 1962 between Thailand and the United States.
230
 This agreement 
bypassed SEATO; the United States would aid Thailand if war broke out. 
 The concern was that the Communists could take over neutral Laos and Thailand would 
become the next target of infiltration and attack. Because SEATO would only take any move if 
there is unanimity of all seven members, Thailand was worried that SEATO would not be helpful 
if Thailand were attacked by the Communists. This was why in March 1962, Thanat Khoman the 
Thai Foreign Minister and Dean Rusk the Secretary of State of the United States signed a 
“communique” to calm Thailand.231 
 Becoming an independent state in accordance with the Geneva Accords in 1954, Laos 
was administered by the Royal Lao government led by Prince Souvanna Phouma. This 
administration to some extent was partial towards the West. The Geneva Accords also allotted 
two “provinces” in Eastern Laos to the Pathet Lao,232 a term coined by the Americans referring 
to the Laotian Communists.
233
  
 Under the stewardship of Prince Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao was supported by the 
North Vietnamese. There was also an attempt by Prince Souvanna Phouma to follow a neutralist 
foreign policy by creating a coalition government composed of the Royal Lao government and 
the Pathet Lao. However, the plan was turned down by the United States.
234
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 Prince Souvanna Phouma was later removed by President Eisenhower in 1959 and 
replaced with General Phoui Sannikone to lead a new administration favouring the West. Prince 
Souphanouvong was arrested and put into prison.
235
 
 Captain Kong Le toppled General Sananikone’s government in August 1960 and 
persuaded Prince Souvanna to head a new neutralist government. However, General Sananikone 
fought back with support from the United States and successfully toppled the neutralist 
government in December 1960. Prince Souvanna Phouma turned to the Pathet Lao, the Soviet 
Union, China, and North Vietnam for assistance.
236
  
 At Geneva, talks between the three Laotian groups (Pathet Lao, neutralist, and pro-
Western) opened in May 1961. On July 23, 1962, a deal was reached.
237
 Prince Souvanna was 
placed as Prime Minister to lead a coalition government consisting of the pro-Western and the 
Pathet Lao groups. An important point was that Laos must agree to the principle of neutrality. 
However, in practice, this Geneva Agreement was breached. The Pathet Lao and North Vietnam 
were allied and troops from the two were stationed in Eastern Laos.
238
  
The neutrality that failed in Lao had important ramifications in the Vietnam War. The 
two eastern provinces of Laos along the boundary of Vietnam were dominated by the 
Communists allowing them to use the Ho Chi Minh Trail as the route for invasion of South 
Vietnam.
239
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ASA 
 Not long after Malaya gained sovereignty in 1957, her leader Tunku Abdul Rahman 
proposed a plan to create the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). To him, poverty was the root 
cause that gave rise to Communism and, thus, a regional bloc had to put an end to it.
240
 Malaysia 
under Tunku Abdul Rahman wanted to fulfill the goal concerning “nationalism” by using 
“regionalism” or ASA. Because members of ASA were “nation-states,” Malaysia’s membership 
in ASA would automatically help Malaysia achieve the status of a “Malaysian nation.” In 
addition, the tension from those who disagreed with the “Malaysian concept” was also lessened. 
Malaysian states boundary would also be prevented from being challenged by countries nearby, 
specifically Indonesia and the Philippines.
241
  
 As a consequence, in 1961, ASA was established with three members: Malaysia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines. According to a message sent by Tunku Abdul Rahman to 
President Sukarno of Indonesia dated October 28, 1951 the aim was:
242
 
to encourage closer relations among the countries of Southeast Asia by discussion, 
conferences, or consultation, and to achieve agreement freely. It is hoped by this method 
that countries will be able to understand each other more deeply. It is also the objective of 
this association to study ways and means of helping one another – particularly in 
economic, social, and cultural and scientific fields… …243 
 At first, both Malaysia and the Philippines wanted ASA to focus on politics and security. 
However, Thailand suggested that it would be too controversial compared to economic 
cooperation, which might possibly captivate other countries. ASA ended up targeting the 
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economic issue. Thanat Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister, did this to differentiate itself from 
the anti-Communism of SEATO.
244
 
 Nevertheless, ASA was seen by Indonesia to be a “Western-inspired,” “anti-communist 
bloc.”245 President Sukarno of Indonesia called ASA an “Anglo-U.S. plot to subvert the newly 
independent states of Southeast Asia.”246 Sukarno’s allegation was confirmed when the leaders 
of Malaysia and the Philippines revealed their anti-communist attitude and standpoint.
247
 In 
September 1963, Malaysia incorporated Sabah in North Borneo, which led to conflict between 
Malaysia and the Philippines and finally resulted in the collapse of ASA. 
248
 
ASEAN 
On August 8, 1967, ASEAN was established with five founding members: Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore.
249
 The new regional organization had many 
goals. According to the Bangkok Declaration 1967
250
, the aims and purposes of ASEAN are: 
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the 
region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to 
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian 
Nations; 
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2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule 
of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles 
of the United Nations Charter; 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest 
in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields; 
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the 
educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres; 
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and 
industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of 
international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and 
communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples; 
 6. To promote South-East Asian studies;  
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional 
organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer 
cooperation among themselves.
251
  
Whether to allow one or two Vietnams to join ASEAN was a controversial topic for 
ASEAN even before the establishment of ASEAN in 1967,
252
 and later when the Vietnam War 
ended in 1975.
253
 The end of fighting and the need for ASEAN to have all states in Southeast 
Asia as members, as suggested by Thanat Khoman, was meant to ensure regional resilience. To 
prevent foreign powers from splitting Southeast Asia, it was necessary for the organization to 
include all countries in Southeast Asia even those with differing political ideologies.
254
 However, 
like ASA, the attempt in 1967 to convince more countries to join the group was in vain.
255
 At 
that time, Vietnam was still divided into two parts each with differing ideologies. There were 
contesting views about whether to let two Vietnams join the new organization. Whilst the 
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membership of both North and South Vietnam would enhance unity within the region, and, thus, 
lead to stability, the admission of North Vietnam was worrisome.
256
 
 However, in the end, Narciso Ramos the Foreign Minister of the Philippines pointed out a 
legitimate reason not to include North Vietnam yet. To become members of ASEAN, “a state 
must be of Southeast Asia” and “a state must conform to ASEAN’s principles and purposes,”257 
which were stated in the aims and purposes of ASEAN in the Bangkok Declaration mentioned 
earlier. These prerequisites derived from Ramos’ speech at the inaugural meeting of ASEAN:258  
The five ASEAN nations have high expectations for this organization and they truly 
welcome its expanded membership. We, however, realize that numbers are not the 
decisive factor in the effectiveness of an international organization. What really matters is 
a member state’s willingness and capability for cooperative endeavors. Thus, we would 
have ASEAN’s membership limited solely to states within South East Asia and only to 
those who subscribe to the principles, aims and purposes enunciated in the Declaration 
and possess mutual interests and common problems shared by the present member 
countries.
259
 
 In addition, the question also arose whether to let South Vietnam join the organization, 
after the rejection of North Vietnam. In the end, South Vietnam was not allowed to join in order 
to avoid being labeled as a group that supported the United States, and to avoid antagonizing 
North Vietnam.
260
  According to the Bangkok Declaration mentioned earlier, the second aim and 
purpose of ASEAN was “To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for 
justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the 
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principles of the United Nations Charter;…”.261 However, in 1967, both North and South 
Vietnam were still highly involved in the Vietnam War. Therefore, admitting either North or 
South Vietnam into ASEAN would be problematic.    
 ASEAN was opposed by North Vietnam at the onset. The “front for American imperialist 
designs in Southeast Asia” was the label North Vietnam gave to ASEAN.262 However, in 1991, 
Vietnam for the first time expressed its intention to join ASEAN. Vietnam was willing to accede 
to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
263
 Following this, Vietnam received 
ASEAN observer status in 1992.
264
 On July 22, 1995, Vietnam joined ASEAN as a full 
member.
265
  
 There were both political and economic reasons for Vietnam to join ASEAN. A survey 
conducted in 1992 in Southeast Asia by a journalist concluded that: “while analysts admit 
ASEAN’s economies are enough bait for Vietnam to consider joining the organization, they say 
Hanoi’s real motive lies in the renewed security threat from its powerful neighbor, China.”266 
  Vietnam’s relations with Thailand and other Indochinese countries improved because of 
Vietnam joining ASEAN. Vietnam also reaped the benefit of being a member of ASEAN by 
pushing Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia to gain ASEAN membership so that Vietnam could play 
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a principal role among these states after the end of the Cold War. Under ASEAN, Vietnam 
assuming such a position would be legitimate. Also, having more members in ASEAN that have 
the same level or worse economic standing than Vietnam would help Vietnam to gain the most 
possible aid from the original members of ASEAN.
267
 In July 2001, the “Hanoi Declaration on 
Narrowing Development Gap for Closer ASEAN Integration” was signed.268 It was the outcome 
of Vietnam’s push to help the newcomers or “CLMV countries” narrow the economic gap with 
the original members.
269
 
Thailand-Vietnam Relations within ASEAN and Widening Cooperation 
Thailand played a critical role in helping Vietnam to join ASEAN. In addition, both also 
cooperated in sub-regional framework the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) and the Mekong 
River Commission (MRC). The major powers did not have much influence on Thailand-Vietnam 
relations in the 1990s. Instead, a regional body like ASEAN became an increasingly important 
factor in determining Thailand-Vietnam relations. As David W. P. Elliott argued, for Vietnam to 
become a member of ASEAN, Vietnam needed to deal with its past animosity toward ASEAN 
members. For the front-line state during the third Indochina conflict like Thailand this was 
particularly the case.
270
 Thanyathip Sripana explained that Vietnam had much to gain from 
normalizing relations with Thailand.
271
 One important benefit was the international perception of 
Vietnam as “a peace loving country” because Vietnam could reconcile with a direct rival like 
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Thailand on the dispute in Cambodia.
272
 Furthermore, economic renovation in Vietnam would be 
enhanced because of a peaceful situation. In other words, the budget would not have to be 
dedicated to military purposes, for example, for the dispute in Cambodia and for border security 
with its neighbors. Lastly, there were lots of economic opportunities from having friendly ties 
with Thailand.
273
 Wang Khak Nam, a professor at the University of Social Sciences and 
Humanities (Vietnam National University),
274
 claimed that Thailand-Vietnam relations were 
enhanced by Vietnam’s ASEAN membership. The rationale behind this was because each 
members’ national interest is what ASEAN collectively strives for. This also prevented the 
involvement of major powers because ASEAN was so concentrated on its goals.
275
 This means 
Thailand-Vietnam relations could not be overly influenced by the major powers as both Thailand 
and Vietnam are members of the same organization pursuing the same interest.  
 As mentioned earlier, the policy of Chatichai Choonhavan “turning the Indochina 
battlefields into market places” was in response to renovation in Vietnam.276 In 1988, the Foreign 
Correspondents Club, Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan revealed that his “foreign policy” 
was that “politics will take second place to economics” and that “rapprochement with Vietnam is 
one of my top priorities.”277 Because ASEAN had been implementing radical measures on 
Vietnam to settle the Cambodian problem, this was a big change in Thai foreign policy.
278
 Some 
believed that Thailand was aiming to hold the upper hand in trade with Indochinese countries 
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and serve as the “link” with them.279 The other notable effect was “ASEAN’s consensual 
diplomacy” in dealing with the dispute in Cambodia was being compromised.280 
The year 1990 was a period in which ASEAN countries held different opinions about 
how to see the new ties with Indochina. Notably, in November 1990, President Suharto travelled 
to Vietnam. Since Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, there was no leader of an ASEAN country 
to travel to North Vietnam. For Indonesia and Vietnam, the gate for economic opportunities was 
opened. However, some countries including Singapore disagreed with this interaction.
281
  
 The new economic policy of Vietnam started to bear fruit as it opened an option for 
ASEAN to invest when prospects of protectionism loomed in Western markets.
282
 In the end, 
Vietnam became a market for all ASEAN members, which legitimized the policy of Chatichai 
Choonhavan earlier.
283
 
 On October 2, 1991, Arsa Sarasin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, delivered the 
following speech at the 46
th
 Session of the United Nations General Assembly:
284
 
It is a great challenge for Thailand to help build a new regional order in Southeast Asia. 
Being an ASEAN member with the closest proximity to the non-ASEAN countries in 
Southeast Asia, Thailand is in a unique position to extend a helping hand to Laos, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar. Through the creation of an atmosphere conducive to 
greater understanding and co-operation, Thailand and ASEAN will move closer to the 
realization of ASEAN’s objectives. We would like to see our neighbours enjoy peace and 
prosperity because they too have the right to contribute to the dynamic future of 
                                                 
279
 Ibid. 
280
 Donald Weatherbee, “ASEAN the Big Loser in Thai Race for Profit in Indochina,” the Strait Times, 
May 5, 1989, cited in Acharya, A New Regional Order in South-East Asia, 42. 
281
 Acharya, A New Regional Order in South-East Asia, 43. 
282
 Ibid., 44. 
283
 Ibid. 
284
 “Excerpt of Statement by H.E. Mr. Arsa Sarasin Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand before the 
46
th
 Session of the United Nations General Assembly New York, October 2, 1991,” Thailand Foreign 
Affairs Newsletter, October-November 1991, 6. 
   64 
Southeast Asia, a future which will truly reflect ASEAN’s objectives and indeed a new 
regional order of harmony and cooperation for Southeast Asia.
285
 
This statement shows that Thailand played the role as the medium between the 
Indochinese countries and Myanmar and ASEAN. Because Thailand assumed this role, Thailand 
and Vietnam relations were also enhanced.   
In addition to Thailand’s cooperation with Vietnam in ASEAN, Thailand-Vietnam 
relations were also close at the sub-regional level. Under the sponsorship of the ADB, in 1992, 
the Greater Mekong Sub-region Program was established. Priority sub-regional projects included 
“transport, energy, agriculture, the environment, and trade facilitation.”286 There were also 
schemes from Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos to create an “East-West road link” or corridor.287 
According to the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), in 1997, the 
GMS ministerial meeting, in Manila, tried to promote this scheme.
288
 The idea of creating the 
corridor was to link Malamang in Burma, Mae Sot, Mukdahan in Thailand, Savannakhet in Laos, 
and Danang in Vietnam. The main goal of this was to promote economic cooperation.
289
 This 
significantly enhanced economic cooperation between Thailand and Vietnam. The two countries 
would become more connected. This also meant closer relations between the Thais and the 
Vietnamese. 
Thailand and Vietnam also cooperated in managing the Mekong river. It was in 1957 that 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam worked together on the Mekong river. At that time, 
the Committee for Coordination of Investigations on the Lower Mekong Basin or the Mekong 
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Committee was organized by the United Nations. However, these four member states gained 
autonomy in administering the river when the Agreement on Cooperation for Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin (the Mekong Agreement) was signed by them on April 
5, 1995, in Chiangrai, Thailand, establishing the “Mekong River Commission” (MRC).290  
During the signing ceremony of the Mekong Agreement, one part of the address by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand was:
291
  
…This agreement is a balanced framework which takes into account the key interests and 
emerging needs of all signatory countries. It touches upon almost all aspects of the lives 
of millions of people who live along the Mekong and strengthens people-to-people ties. 
Most important of all, this agreement underscores the cardinal principle of reasonable and 
equitable uses of water. It is indeed a firm and practical foundation for mutually 
beneficial cooperation amongst the parties. …292  
According to this speech, the Mekong agreement was vital for people-to-people ties. Both 
the Thailand and Vietnam could use this framework to further deepen their relations in other 
areas aside from political and economic cooperation. This idea was in fact stated by Anand 
Panyarachun the former Prime Minister of Thailand at the seminar on “Thai-Vietnamese 
Relations in the Present Decade and Prospects for Cooperation in the Future” hosted by “the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Thammasat University” in 1996. He stated that “mutual relations 
are not based on joint communiques but on people-to-people relationships, which should come 
before politics and economic issues.”293  
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 In short, in this post-cold war period, Vietnam’s relations with foreign countries shifted 
in nature. Because the Soviet Union had less influence in the Southeast Asian region, Vietnam 
chose to have good relations with China even though it was not a very reliable partner. On the 
other hand, the United States and Japan worked together to make Vietnam comply with their 
demands. It turned out that ASEAN was to be the more important ally for Vietnam by the end of 
the twentieth century. In the past, there were attempts at regional integration but they failed. 
Such attempts were also seen as dominated by the West. However, ASEAN was different in that 
it tried to avoid being influenced by any major power. Vietnam at that time was also separated 
into two parts making it unable to join ASEAN when it was established because of concerns 
about ideology and major powers’ influence on the organization. Thailand-Vietnam relations 
improved because of ASEAN. Thailand assumed the role of engaging Vietnam with ASEAN. 
The relations between the two countries expanded into sub-regional organizations which were 
the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) and the Mekong River Commission (MRC). This also 
enhanced people-to-people ties between the two countries. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis studies Thailand-Vietnam relations in the 1990s. It began by looking back to 
the history of relations between the two countries. Under Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong in 
1946, Thailand’s relations with Vietnam were intimate because he supported the independence 
movement in many ways. However, when the military returned to power in 1947, bilateral 
relations were strained because the military chose to side with the United States against 
Communism.  
Winning the war in 1975, Hanoi promptly approached Thailand to find ways to establish 
diplomatic relations. However, the negotiation did not go very well as there were some issues 
that could not be agreed on, particularly about the Vietnamese migrants in Thailand and the 
ownership of aircraft and weapons. In the end, both agreed to put these issues aside as a matter to 
be negotiated later and they decided to establish diplomatic relations on August 6, 1976 on four 
principles. One of the principles was to avoid intervention from major powers as had happened 
in the Second Indochina war. The path of their bilateral relations that seemed to be working 
turned rough when Vietnam invaded Cambodia at the end of 1978. It was about a decade later 
when Vietnam decided to withdraw its troops.  
During 1976-1985, Vietnam faced a macroeconomic crisis. The Second Five Year Plan 
(1976-1980) met with failure. Because of that economic crisis, Vietnam adopted a more 
capitalist economic solution. The Third Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) introduced a capitalist 
economy; state enterprises did not have to rely on the state budget but could find resources 
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elsewhere and a certain amount of the yield could be sold at a price determined by the market. 
This plan was a success. 
Then this thesis looked into various documents that determined Vietnamese foreign 
policy in the 1990s. The “Doi Moi” policy adopted at the 6th National Party Congress in 
December 1986 was one of the most important policies. Many features of the capitalist economy 
were adopted in Vietnam.  The Political Report of the 6
th
 Party Congress in 1986 also indicated 
Vietnam’s softer approach towards Southeast Asian countries and the Cambodian conflict.  
Resolution No. 32 adopted by the Politburo in June 1986 also showed Vietnam’s more 
compromising stance on the Cambodian conflict. Resolution No.13 adopted in May 1988 at the 
6
th
 Politburo Assembly showed more openness in foreign relations. It later brought about the 
policy that “Vietnam wants to befriend all countries in the international community and to strive 
for peace, independence, and development,” adopted in June 1991 at the 7th National Party 
Congress. The “Strategy for Socio-Economic Stability and Development until 2000” was also 
adopted. “Multilateralization and diversification” of economic relations became the theme of that 
strategy. At the 8
th
 Political Party Congress, there were some conservatives in Vietnam who were 
not pleased with the reform especially on Vietnam’s ASEAN membership and normalization 
with the United States. However, ASEAN was finally mentioned in the Political Report.   
The change in Vietnam led to the “turning the Indochina battlefields into market places” 
policy of the Chatichai Choonhavan government. Chatichai Choonhavan was quite different 
from General Prem Tinsulanonda who took office before him. Whilst the administration under 
General Prem Tinsulanonda implemented tough measures on Vietnam related to the Cambodian 
conflict, the administration under Chatichai Choonhavan tried to engage Vietnam in economic 
cooperation grounds.  
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The bilateral relations between Thailand and Vietnam in the early 1990s were full of 
economic cooperation. In 1991, they agreed on the Agreement on the Establishment of the Joint 
Commission on Economic Cooperation. In the following years, many more agreements on 
economic cooperation were reached. By the late 1990s, both could reach agreements on very 
sensitive issues: Vietnamese non-refugees, maritime boundary, and visa exemption. In 1996, 
their cooperation expanded into cultural aspects. Thailand also provided Vietnam with technical 
assistance. In addition, Ban Na Jok village also helped foster their relations. The warm relations 
were also confirmed by the exchanges of high level visits between the two countries. This study 
also shows that the trade value between the two countries rose each year during 1990-2000. 
 Vietnam’s relations with major powers, ASEAN, and the sub-regional organizations were 
also discussed. The major powers were not very supportive for Vietnam in the post-Cold War 
period. From 1989-1991, the Soviet Union suffered from the four “losses.” It was not in a 
position to help Vietnam. There were also many indications of the Soviet Union downgrading 
relations with Vietnam. China, on the other hand, normalized relations with Vietnam in 
November 1991 after the Cambodian conflict was settled in October. However, it was not as 
cordial as before. In addition, there remained territorial disputes between the two countries. As 
for the United States, bilateral relations with Vietnam were not normalized until 1995. Before 
that, the United States imposed sanctions on Vietnam and pushed Vietnam on the prisoner of war 
and missing in action issue. Although Japan had initiated the Fukuda doctrine in 1977, which 
was supportive of Vietnam, it later followed the United States policy in imposing sanctions on 
Vietnam because of the prisoner of war and missing in action issue. The Fukuda doctrine was 
revived in 1991. In 1992, Official Development Assistance (ODA) of Japan to Vietnam was re-
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introduced, which was also supported by the United States. In the end, ASEAN was more 
reliable than any of these major powers in the 1990s.  
Before the establishment of ASEAN, SEATO and ASA were the two important regional 
organizations in Southeast Asia. SEATO was clearly initiated by the United States to serve its 
purpose to fight against Communism. However, because of events in Laos, it caused worry for 
Thailand. Thailand was not confident whether SEATO would be helpful in case Thailand was 
invaded by Communist Lao given that SEATO could only operate if there was “unanimity” of all 
seven members. In the end, the United States made a bilateral assurance of its support in case 
Thailand were harmed by the Communists. This agreement was called the “Thanat-Rusk 
Communique.” ASA was a regional organization initiated by Malaysia. Again, it was seen as an 
organization influenced by the West and anti-Communism. It later broke down because of the 
conflict within its members. ASEAN was quite different from these two organizations. ASEAN 
had considered two times if ASEAN should accept Vietnam’s membership: before the creation 
of ASEAN and around the period when the Vietnam War ended. However, when considering 
whether to accept North or South Vietnam, ASEAN rejected both in order to avoid being labeled 
as siding with the West, or indirectly causing conflict. Regardless of the fact that North Vietnam 
accused ASEAN earlier of siding with the West, in 1991, Vietnam expressed its intention to 
consider the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Thailand helped Vietnam in 
dealing with ASEAN. Vietnam later obtained observer status in 1992 and became a member in 
1995. In joining ASEAN, Vietnam gained benefits politically and economically. Thailand-
Vietnam relations also expanded to sub-regional organizations, particularly the Greater Mekong 
Sub-region (GMS) and the Mekong River Commission (MRC). 
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